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‘A MOTIVATING FACTOR’ – THE IMPACT OF EEOC V. 
ABERCROMBIE & FITCH STORES, INC. ON TITLE VII RELIGIOUS 
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
INTRODUCTION 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects, amongst other things, an 
employee or potential employee from being discriminated against on the basis 
of his or her religion.1 A primary tool for religious discrimination cases, Title 
VII makes it unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire, discharge, or 
otherwise discriminate against any individual on the basis of religion, which is 
defined to include religious observance or practice.2 Additionally, the statute 
places an affirmative duty upon employers to reasonably accommodate an 
employee’s religious beliefs or practices in the workplace, so long as the 
accommodation does not impose an undue hardship upon the employer’s 
business.3 Prior to summer 2015, there was a lack of clarity regarding the 
standard of knowledge that an employer must hold of a current or potential 
employee’s need for a religious accommodation in order to have notice and be 
potentially liable under Title VII. Generally, lower courts held that an applicant 
or employee needed to directly and specifically inform the employer of his or 
her need for an accommodation in order to establish the standard of notice 
required to succeed on a failure to accommodate claim.4 
On June 1, 2015, the Supreme Court issued guidance regarding this 
standard in its decision EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.5 In this 
case, brought by a Muslim, headscarf-wearing plaintiff, Samantha Elauf, the 
Court separated the concepts of knowledge and motive under Title VII, and 
held that an employee is not required to explicitly inform an employer of the 
need for a religious accommodation; rather, so long as the employee can show 
that the need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer’s 
adverse decision, then the employer is potentially liable.6 
 
 1. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 2. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); Jennifer Ann Drobac & Jill L. Wesley, Religion and 
Employment Antidiscrimination Law: Past, Present, and Post Hosanna-Tabor, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 761, 783 (2014). 
 3. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 
 4. Drobac & Wesley, supra note 2, at 791. 
 5. 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015). 
 6. Id. at 2032–33. 
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Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Abercrombie, lower courts have 
been faced with the task of applying its holding to failure to accommodate 
cases, which has in some instances altered the entire standard, and in others 
provided an alternative means by which an employee can prove his or her 
case.7 This Note will examine the background of religious discrimination cases 
on the grounds of failure to accommodate, the standard of notice for these 
cases prior to Abercrombie, the decision itself, and the impact the decision has 
had thus far on lower courts. Finally, the Note will predict the future policy 
implications the Abercrombie case may have on religious discrimination law as 
a whole. 
I.  BACKGROUND – TITLE VII RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION 
A. Title VII Overview 
Title VII, the Equal Employment Opportunities provision of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, provides statutory guidance for federal employment 
discrimination litigation.8 Title VII broadly encompasses all aspects of 
employment discrimination, including but not limited to discriminatory 
practices in recruitment, hiring, promotion, provision of wages or benefits, 
layoffs, termination, and discharge.9 Title VII covers the following “protected 
classes”: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.10 The Act was passed in 
response to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and the demand to protect 
individual rights and enforce equal treatment in the context of the workplace.11 
Title VII also created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), the federal administration and enforcement agency to which all 
employment discrimination claims and grievances must be submitted before 
litigation can be pursued.12 
The language of the intentional discrimination portion of Title VII 
provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
 
 7. See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Jetstream Ground Servs., Inc., 134 F. 
Supp. 3d 1298, 1317 (D. Colo. 2015). 
 8. 39 CAUSES OF ACTION 327 (2d ed. 2009). 
 9. Laws Enforced by the Employment Litigation Section, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHT DIVISION, https://www.justice.gov/crt/laws-enforced-employment-litga 
tion-section (last visited Dec. 12, 2016) [http://perma.cc/D3DL-LBTY]. 
 10. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 11. RAYMOND F. GREGORY, ENCOUNTERING RELIGION IN THE WORKPLACE: THE LEGAL 
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF WORKERS AND EMPLOYERS 27 (2011). 
 12. See 39 CAUSES OF ACTION, supra note 8, at 329. 
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conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.13 
Broadly speaking, Title VII provides employees and potential employees with 
a federal statutory avenue for resolving discrimination claims, whether it be on 
the basis of race, ethnicity or nationality, religion, or sex. Religious 
discrimination claims under Title VII in particular have generally been divided 
into two categories by courts and commentators: disparate treatment and 
failure to accommodate.14 
B. Section 2000(e)(j) – The Duty to Accommodate 
In 1972, Title VII was amended to include section 2000(e)(j), which states 
that “the term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and 
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to 
reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious 
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the 
employer’s business.”15 This section places an affirmative duty upon 
employers to reasonably accommodate an employee or prospective employee’s 
religious practices in the workplace.16 The language of section 2000(e)(j) has 
brought about the category of claims known as failure to accommodate cases, 
where an employee complains that he or she suffered an adverse employment 
decision as a result of the employer disallowing a religious practice in the 
workplace, or failing to accommodate such practice. These cases often involve 
situations such as scheduling issues due to religious obligations,17 violations of 
grooming or dress code policies,18 or various miscellaneous acts or omissions 
such as: a truck driving employee’s ingesting of a hallucinogenic drug as part 
of a religious practice and against company policy;19 a pharmacist’s refusal to 
sell birth control pills for religious reasons;20 and an employee’s desire to wear 
a graphic anti-abortion button at work.21 
 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 14. Roberto L. Corrada, Toward an Integrated Disparate Treatment and Accommodation 
Framework for Title VII Religion Cases, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1411, 1411 (2009). 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 
 16. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). (Essentially, an 
employer’s refusal to accommodate is justified only where it can demonstrate that an undue 
hardship will result through making the accommodation). See also GREGORY, supra note 11, at 
186. 
 17. See Sturgill v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 512 F.3d 1024, 1027 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 18. See Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984); Cloutier v. 
Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 128 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 19. See Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 892 F.2d 1481, 1486 (10th Cir. 1989). 
 20. See Noesen v. Med. Staffing Network, 232 F. App’x 581, 582 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 21. See Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, 58 F.3d 1337, 1339 (8th Cir. 1995). 
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C. Analyzing Failure to Accommodate Cases: The Burden-Shifting 
Framework 
Over the years, courts have developed a well-established, two-part burden-
shifting analysis for approaching failure to accommodate cases.22 This 
framework first requires that a plaintiff establish what is known as a prima 
facie discrimination case.23 If the plaintiff is successful in doing so, the burden 
then shifts to the employer to show that it either attempted to accommodate the 
employee’s practice, or was unable to do so without imposing an undue 
hardship on itself.24 Though courts have facilitated this standard through the 
use of specific elements, generally, these cases are extremely fact-intensive, 
requiring an in-depth case-by-case inquiry.25 
D. What Constitutes Notice? 
1. EEOC Guidance 
The 2008 EEOC Compliance Manual provided guidance regarding the 
extent to which an employee is responsible for informing an employer of the 
need for an accommodation under section 2000(e)(j). Regarding notice, the 
manual states that “[a]n applicant or employee who seeks religious 
accommodation must make the employer aware both of the need for 
accommodation and that it is being requested due to a conflict between religion 
and work,” and that the employee is required “to explain the religious nature of 
the belief or practice at issue, and cannot assume that the employer will already 
know or understand it.”26 And although the EEOC contends that there are no 
“magic words” an employee must use in order to place the employer on notice, 
it does state that the “applicant or employee must provide enough information 
to make the employer aware that there exists a conflict between the 
individual’s religious practice or belief and a requirement for applying for or 
performing the job,” and further goes on to outline a “Discussion on 
Request.”27 This implies that, based on EEOC guidelines, inferred knowledge 
 
 22. Sarah Abigail Wolkinson, A Critical Historical and Legal Reappraisal of Bhatia v. 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.: Judicial Emasculation of the Duty of Accommodation, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
1185, 1189 (2010). (This is a version of the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting approach 
utilized in other realms of Title VII discrimination). See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. 
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 23. See Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1122. 
 24. See id. (This two-part burden-shifting analysis for religious discrimination cases was 
originally established in Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986)). 
 25. See EEOC v. Robert Bosch Corp., 169 F. App’x 942, 944 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 26. EEOC Compliance Manual, No. 915.003 § 12-IV (July 2008), www.eeoc.gov/policy/ 
docs/religion.html [http://perma.cc/VJL8-SENY]. 
 27. Id. (emphasis added). 
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alone is insufficient to place an employer on notice regarding the need for an 
accommodation. 
2. The Prima Facie Standard and Establishing Sufficient Notice 
Reflected in the specific prima facie standard that courts applied prior to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Abercrombie is the notion that an employer 
was required to have actual knowledge of an employee’s need for an 
accommodation in order to trigger the duty to accommodate. A large majority 
of courts applied a three-prong prima facie case, the second element of which 
was that an employee must “tell” or “inform” his or her employer of a religious 
belief in some capacity.28 For example, in the Tenth Circuit, the Circuit out of 
which Samantha Elauf’s case arose, a plaintiff made a prima facie case by 
showing that (1) she had a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an 
employment requirement; (2) she informed her employer of this belief; and (3) 
she was fired [or not hired] for failure to comply with the conflicting 
employment requirement.29 
3. Notice Across the Circuits – The “Split” 
Aside from being reflected in the language of the prima facie standard 
itself, before the Supreme Court’s decision in Abercrombie, various circuits 
were faced with questions regarding the extent to which an employee must 
inform its employer, and the level of knowledge an employer must have of the 
employee’s accommodation need, in order for a failure to accommodate case 
to move forward. These cases and the varying holdings across circuits provide 
some insight into the tension surrounding the notice standard of failure to 
 
 28. See Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 319 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(The second element of plaintiff’s prima facie case is that “she told the employer about the 
conflict.”); Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 449 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[The 
plaintiff] must show that he ‘called the religious observance or practice to [his] employer’s 
attention.’”); Sanchez-Rodriguez v. AT & T Mobility Puerto Rico, Inc., 673 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 
2012) (holding the second element of plaintiff’s case is “that he or she brought the practice to 
[employer’s] attention”); see also Seaworth v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1056, 1057 (8th Cir. 2000); 
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 312 (4th 
Cir. 2008); Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1383 (9th Cir. 1984); Brener v. 
Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 144 (5th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Pyro Min. Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 
1085 (6th Cir. 1987) (each holding that the second element of a plaintiff’s prima facie case is to 
“inform” the employer of the bona fide religious belief). 
 29. Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1122 (Notably, “failure to accommodate” cases do not end 
here. All courts then shift the burden to the employer to “(1) conclusively rebut one or more 
elements of the . . . prima facie case, (2) show that it offered a reasonable accommodation, or (3) 
show that it was unable reasonably to accommodate the employee’s religious needs without 
undue hardship,” before holding the employer liable for religious discrimination as a matter of 
law). 
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accommodate cases leading up to the Supreme Court’s decision in Samantha 
Elauf’s case. 
a. The Ninth Circuit – Heller v. EBB Auto Co. 
The Ninth Circuit was faced with the issue of the extent to which an 
employee is required to inform an employer of the need for a religious 
accommodation in the case Heller v. EBB Auto Co. In Heller, a Jewish used-
car salesman asked his supervisor for permission to miss work to attend his 
wife’s conversion ceremony on a Friday morning.30 He was not given 
permission to miss work and was subsequently fired for doing so.31 The court 
held that although Heller did not explain the specific nature of the ceremony to 
his employer, the overall circumstances of the case showed that the employer 
had sufficient notice of Heller’s need for an accommodation, and thus Heller 
succeeded in establishing a prima facie case.32 The employer in this case knew 
that Heller was Jewish, that his wife was studying for a conversion ceremony, 
and that this ceremony was the reason he needed to miss work.33 In holding 
that this was sufficient to establish notice, the court stated that “[a]ny greater 
notice requirement would permit an employer to delve into the religious 
practices of an employee in order to determine whether religion mandates the 
employee’s adherence,” which, the court reasoned, was beyond the realm of 
both courts and employers.34 
b. The Eighth Circuit – Brown v. Polk County Iowa 
Following Heller, the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Brown v. Polk County 
Iowa also impacted lower courts’ interpretation of the notice standard. The 
plaintiff in this case, Brown, identified himself as a born-again Christian, and 
was reprimanded and later fired after holding prayers in his office and having 
his work secretary type Bible study notes for him during work hours.35 After 
Brown brought a religious discrimination claim under Title VII, the employer 
argued that because he “never explicitly asked for accommodation for his 
religious activities, he may not claim the protections of Title VII.”36 The court, 
however, rejected this argument, holding that an employer need have “only 
 
 30. Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1437 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 1438–39. 
 33. Id. at 1439. 
 34. Id. The court in Heller declined to follow Wessling v. Kroger Co., 554 F. Supp. 548 
(E.D. Mich. 1982). This case concluded that a plaintiff merely informing her employer that she 
needed to miss work to assist with her daughter’s Christmas play was insufficient notice under 
Title VII, as the notice “was not in terms of a request for an accommodation of her religious 
practices.” Wessling, 554 F. Supp. at 552. 
 35. Brown v. Polk Cnty., Iowa, 61 F.3d 650, 652 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 36. Id. at 654. 
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enough information about an employee’s religious needs to permit the 
employer to understand the existence of a conflict between the employee’s 
religious practices and the employer’s job requirements.”37 The court held that 
in the particular circumstances of this case, where Brown’s reprimand related 
“directly to religious activities,” it could be inferred that the employer “[was] 
well aware of the potential for conflict between their expectations and Mr. 
Brown’s religious activities.”38 
c. The Eleventh Circuit – Dixon and Hellinger 
Cases in the Eleventh Circuit following Brown likewise provided a 
broader, more inferential standard in establishing notice. In Dixon v. The 
Hallmark Companies, Inc., the court held that plaintiffs possibly satisfied the 
second prong of a prima facie failure to accommodate case although they never 
explicitly informed their employer the religious grounds on which they 
opposed its policy of removing artwork in the workplace.39 The court held that 
under Brown, so long as a jury could reasonably infer that the employer 
“connected” the employees’ behavior with their religious beliefs, then this 
awareness was sufficient to establish notice.40 Also following Brown, the court 
in Hellinger v. Eckerd Corp. found notice to be sufficient where the employer 
received information about a plaintiff’s religious restrictions from a third party 
rather than from the plaintiff himself, and the evidence supported the 
conclusion that the employer decided not to hire the plaintiff based upon this 
information.41 
d. The Third Circuit – Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond 
Other circuits, however, had not been as friendly in making inferences in 
the employee’s favor on the issue of notice. The Fourth Circuit established a 
guideline regarding notice in Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond. In this case, 
an employee was terminated for writing strongly-worded letters to co-workers 
regarding God being displeased with their immoral lifestyles.42 The court held 
that the plaintiff had failed to establish the second prong of her prima facie 
case, since there was no evidence that she notified her employer that her 
 
 37. Id. (citing Heller, 8 F.3d at 1439). 
 38. Id. 
 39. 627 F.3d 849, 855 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 40. Id. at 856 (“[W]e conclude that if Saunders was aware of the tension between her order 
and the Dixons’ religious beliefs—and there is ample evidence that she was—her awareness 
would satisfy the second prong.”). 
 41. 67 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (“It would be hyper-technical, based on the 
facts of this case, to require notice of the Plaintiff’s religious beliefs to come only from the 
Plaintiff.”). 
 42. 101 F.3d 1012, 1016 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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religion required her to send the letters.43 The plaintiff claimed that because of 
“the notoriety of her religious beliefs within the company,” she did not need to 
directly inform her employer of this particular belief in order to establish 
notice for her claim.44 The court rejected this argument, holding that 
“[k]nowledge that an employee has strong religious beliefs does not place an 
employer on notice that she might engage in any religious activity, no matter 
how unusual.”45 Finally, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the letters 
themselves provided the employer with sufficient notice, reasoning that the 
contemporaneous nature between her violation of company policy and 
potential notice of her conflict precluded her claim, since notice must occur in 
advance of the adverse employment decision.46 
e. The Seventh Circuit – Reed v. Great Lakes Companies, Inc. 
In construing the notice standard, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit 
refused to provide great latitude to an employee in placing an employer on 
notice of religious beliefs or practices. In Reed v. Great Lakes Companies, Inc., 
a hotel employee refused to attend a meeting involving Bible readings and 
prayer, and was later fired for insubordination after a hostile exchange with a 
manager.47 In rejecting the plaintiff’s contention that he was fired because of 
his religious beliefs under Title VII, Posner stated: 
A person’s religion is not like his sex or race—something obvious at a glance. 
Even if he wears a religious symbol, such as a cross or a yarmulka, this may 
not pinpoint his particular beliefs and observances; and anyway employers are 
not charged with detailed knowledge of the beliefs and observances associated 
with particular sects. Suppose the employee is an Orthodox Jew and believes 
that it is deeply sinful to work past sundown on Friday. He does not tell his 
employer, the owner of a hardware store that is open from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. on 
Fridays, who leaves the employee in sole charge of the store one Friday 
afternoon in mid-winter, and at 4 p.m. the employee leaves the store. The 
 
 43. Id. at 1019. 
 44. Id. at 1020. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. Notably, the court did not hold that the nature of the letters were themselves 
insufficient to establish notice, only that the timing was misaligned. Further, it held that “refusal 
even to attempt to accommodate an employee’s religious requests, prior to the employee’s 
violation of employment rules and sanction, provides some indication, however slight, of 
improper motive on the employer’s part.” Id. at 1020–21 (Interestingly, in a footnote in this case, 
the Court stated that “[w]e emphasize that we do not hold . . . that an employer’s knowledge of an 
employee’s sincere religious beliefs can never put an employer on notice of the possibility of 
some religious conduct by an employee at work, e.g. display of ashes on Ash Wednesday or 
wearing a yarmulke, etc.”). Id. at 1020 n.3. 
 47. 330 F.3d 931, 933 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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employer could fire him without being thought guilty of failing to 
accommodate his religious needs.48 
Other circuits have likewise cited to Judge Posner’s guidance in retaining a 
stricter view of notice for failure to accommodate cases.49 
II.  EEOC V. ABERCROMBIE & FITCH, INC. – SAMANTHA ELAUF’S CASE 
A. Facts 
On June 25, 2008, then seventeen-year-old plaintiff Samantha Elauf 
applied for a job at an Abercrombie Kids retail clothing store at a shopping 
mall in Tulsa, Oklahoma.50 A practicing Muslim, Elauf wears a headscarf, or 
hijab, at all times while in public or in the presence of male strangers, which 
she believes is a requirement of her faith.51 At the time she applied, Elauf was 
unaware that the Abercrombie company had a “Look Policy,” a dress and 
appearance code with which employees were required to comply.52 
Abercrombie’s “Look Policy” prohibited, amongst other things, an employee 
from wearing “caps,” but did not specify the type of headwear encompassed 
within this definition.53 
The day after she submitted her job application, Elauf was interviewed at 
the Tulsa store by assistant store manager Heather Cooke.54 At no point during 
the interview was Elauf’s headscarf or the no “caps” store policy discussed.55 
Elauf wore her headscarf at the interview, and Cooke testified in a deposition 
that she was aware that Elauf wore the headscarf because of a religious 
 
 48. Id. at 935–36 (emphasis added). 
 49. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 319 (3d Cir. 
2008) (holding that that an employer’s general knowledge of an employee’s Christian beliefs was 
not sufficient to put the employer on notice that the employee would need an accommodation at a 
ceremony where alcoholic drinks were served). 
 50. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 798 F. Supp. 2d. 
1272, 1277 (2011). 
 51. Id. at 1276. 
 52. Id. at 1277. 
 53. Id. at 1275–76. According to the evidence presented to the trial court, 
Abercrombie trains store managers ‘never to assume anything about anyone’ in a job 
interview, and not to ask applicants about their religion. If there are issues or questions 
regarding the Look Policy or an employee requests a religious accommodation, the store 
manager is instructed to contact Abercrombie’s Human Resources Department and/or 
their direct supervisor. The Human Resources managers have the individual discretion to 
grant accommodations ‘as long as it’s not going to distract from the brand.’ 
Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Abercrombie, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1277. 
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belief.56 Cooke believed Elauf was a good candidate for the job, but was 
uncertain of how to reconcile Elauf’s headscarf with the company’s headwear 
prohibition.57 Cooke then contacted her district manager to discuss Elauf’s 
interview, informing the district manager she felt as though Elauf were a strong 
candidate and should be hired, despite the fact that she wore a headscarf in 
violation of the “Look Policy,” since the headscarf was worn for religious 
reasons.58 According to Cooke’s testimony, the district manager advised her to 
not hire Elauf, since employees were “not allowed to wear hats at work.”59 
Based on this conversation with the district manager, Cooke threw out Elauf’s 
original interview rating sheet and created a new one, subtracting points in the 
category of “Appearance and Sense of Style” such that Elauf’s score was 
below that which is required for hiring.60 Elauf was not extended a job offer by 
the Tulsa store.61 
B. District Court – Notice Was Met 
On behalf of Elauf, the EEOC brought a Title VII failure to accommodate 
case against Abercrombie, and filed for summary judgment regarding the issue 
of Abercrombie’s liability.62 In attempting to rebut an element of Elauf’s prima 
facie case, Abercrombie contended that Elauf did not satisfy the notice 
requirement, since she did not tell the interviewer that she had a religious 
belief that conflicted with the “Look Policy” and that she needed an 
accommodation.63 The trial court cited to Brown and Dixon in stating that “the 
notice requirement is met when an employer has enough information to make 
it aware there exists a conflict between the individual’s religious practice or 
belief and a requirement for applying for or performing the job.”64 The court 
 
 56. Id. (“Cooke testified that the head scarf signified to her that Elauf was Muslim and, ‘I 
figured that was the religious reason why she wore her head scarf, she was Muslim,’ and ‘I just 
assumed that she was Muslim because of the head scarf was for religious reasons.’”). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1278. 
 59. Id. The district manager denied that he was informed by Cooke that Elauf’s headscarf 
was worn for religious reasons. 
 60. Abercrombie, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1279. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. at 1282. The trial court applied the same burden-shifting standard as the Tenth 
Circuit discussed above, wherein the plaintiff initially bears the burden of production with respect 
to a prima facie case by showing that (1) she had a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an 
employment requirement; (2) she informed the employer of this belief; and (3) she was not hired 
for failing to comply with the employment requirement; the burden then shifts to the defendant, 
who must: “(1) conclusively rebut one or more elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, (2) 
show that it offered a reasonable accommodation, or (3) show that it was unable to accommodate 
the employee’s religious needs reasonably without undue hardship.” Id. 
 63. Id. at 1285. 
 64. Id. 
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went on to discuss the policy reasons that notice is required, since it facilitates 
an interactive process between employer and employee and aligns with the 
statutory requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act, where the 
employee has the initial duty to inform the employer of the need for an 
accommodation.65 However, the court ultimately found that because Elauf was 
wearing her headscarf at the job interview, and Cooke testified that she was 
aware that Elauf wore the headscarf based on a religious belief and may 
possibly need an accommodation, the notice requirement was met in this 
case.66 After also examining the issues of a sincerely held religious belief and 
undue hardship, the District Court granted summary judgment against 
Abercrombie and in favor of Elauf.67 
C. Tenth Circuit Appeal – Equating Notice and Actual Knowledge 
Abercrombie appealed the case to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
claiming, in pertinent part, that notice was not established in this case.68 The 
court first looked to the “plain language” of precedent in the Tenth Circuit in 
Thomas and Toledo, stating that the second prong of the prima facie case 
required that the employee or prospective employee must show that “she 
informed . . . her employer of this [religious] belief” that conflicts with the 
employer’s workplace policy.69 The court continued on to cite multiple other 
circuits that also required the “informed” component in a plaintiff’s prima facie 
case.70 The court countered the holdings in Dixon, Hellinger, and Brown, 
asserting that none of these cases rebutted the idea that actual knowledge of the 
need for a religious accommodation is required in order to place an employer 
on notice.71 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit concluded that in meeting a prima 
facie case, an employee must establish that the employer had “particularized, 
actual knowledge” of a conflicting religious practice and the need for an 
accommodation.72 Here, it was not enough that Cooke “assumed” or “figured” 
that Elauf wore a headscarf for religious reasons; this was insufficient to show 
that Abercrombie possessed actual knowledge and therefore notice of the need 
 
 65. See Abercrombie, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1285–86. 
 66. Id. at 1286. 
 67. See generally id. 
 68. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 
1122– 23 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 69. Id. at 1123 (citing Thomas v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th 
Cir. 2000) and Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 892 F.2d 1481, 1486 (10th Cir. 1989)). 
 70. See Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1124. 
 71. See id. at 1124–26 (“[T]here is no doubt that these cases settled for nothing less than 
some significant measure of particularized, actual knowledge.”). 
 72. Id. at 1126–27. 
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to accommodate.73 Thus, the Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment, holding that because Elauf had not informed her 
potential employer of her religious conflict or the need for an accommodation, 
the second element of the prima facie case was not satisfied, and the duty to 
accommodate was not triggered for Abercrombie.74 
D. Supreme Court Holding – Motive and Knowledge as Separate Concepts 
Elauf’s case was then appealed to the Supreme Court, with the sole issue 
being whether Title VII’s prohibition on an employer’s refusal to hire an 
employee in order to avoid accommodation of a religious practice only applies 
where the applicant has informed the employer of his or her need for an 
accommodation.75 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia disagreed with the 
Tenth Circuit’s decision and found that, rather than showing actual knowledge, 
an applicant need only show that the “need for an accommodation was a 
motivating factor in the employer’s decision.”76 The Court took sections 
2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000(e)(j) of Title VII together in holding that the language 
of the statute does not impose a knowledge requirement,77 and laid out the idea 
that “[m]otive and knowledge are separate concepts.”78 Thus, the Court held, 
the rule in failure to accommodate religious practice cases is “straightforward: 
An employer may not make an applicant’s religious practice, confirmed or 
otherwise, a factor in employment decisions.”79 Further, the Court rejected 
Abercrombie’s contention that a neutral company policy could not be in 
violation of Title VII, since the statute “does not demand mere neutrality with 
regard to religious practices,” but rather, “gives them favored treatment.”80 
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of Title VII’s requirements was 
incorrect, and the case was remanded.81 
 
 73. Id. at 1128. “In sum, in light of Title VII’s conception of religion and the interactive 
nature of the religion-accommodation process, we have difficulty seeing how we could logically 
reach a conclusion other than the one that we explicate here regarding the notice element of the 
prima facie case.” Id. at 1135. The Court also cited to the EEOC compliance manual in holding 
that the informing of and request for an accommodation must be explicit and specific. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1143. 
 75. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031 (2015). 
 76. Id. at 2032 (emphasis added). 
 77. Id. at 2032–33 (“We construe Title VII’s silence as exactly that: silence.”). 
 78. Id. at 2033 (“An employer who has actual knowledge of the need for an accommodation 
does not violate Title VII by refusing to hire an applicant if avoiding that accommodation is not 
his motive. Conversely, an employer who acts with the motive of avoiding accommodation may 
violate Title VII even if he has no more than an unsubstantiated suspicion that accommodation 
would be needed.”). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2034. 
 81. Id. 
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E. Concurrence and Dissent of the Supreme Court Case 
Concurring with the judgment, Justice Alito agreed that the Tenth Circuit 
misinterpreted the notice requirement, since Title VII does not impose an 
actual knowledge standard, but felt that some degree of awareness should be 
clearly established in order to trigger an employer’s duty to accommodate.82 
Otherwise, a “strange result” would ensue in that, in this case for example, 
Abercrombie could be liable whether or not it knew that Elauf wore her 
headscarf for religious reasons.83 Here, because there was sufficient evidence 
to show that Abercrombie was aware that Elauf wore her headscarf for 
religious reasons, liability under Title VII was appropriate.84 Dissenting, 
Justice Thomas did not feel as though it were possible that Abercrombie had 
engaged in any violation under Title VII while merely applying a neutral dress 
policy that incidentally “fall[s] more harshly” upon Muslim women or any 
other religious group.85 Justice Thomas disagreed that section 2000(e)(j) and 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hardison “create[d] a freestanding failure-to-
accommodate claim distinct from either disparate treatment or disparate 
impact.”86 Thomas argued that while the Court today had “rightly put[] to rest 
the notion” that a freestanding religious-accommodation action exists, it had 
replaced it with an “entirely new form of liability: the disparate-treatment-
based-on-equal-treatment claim,” and thus erroneously redefined “intentional 
discrimination.”87 
III.  POST-ABERCROMBIE CASES – APPLYING THE SUPREME COURT’S HOLDING 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Abercrombie, lower courts have 
been tasked with applying the holding to religious discrimination cases where 
appropriate. Even in a short time, courts have already taken varying 
approaches in doing so. 
 
 82. Id. at 2035 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2035. 
 85. Id. at 2038 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 86. Id. at 2041. 
 87. Id. at 2041–42. Interestingly, the majority in its decision stated that Title VII creates just 
two causes of action: “disparate treatment” (intentional discrimination) and “disparate impact.” 
Id. at 2032. Section 2000(e)(j) and the duty to accommodate was seemingly merged in with the 
definition of “religion” under Title VII’s “disparate treatment” provision, creating a standard 
which provides that it is unlawful for employer to “(1) ‘fail . . . to hire’ an applicant (2) ‘because 
of’ (3) ‘such individual’s . . . religion’ (which includes his religious practice).” See id. at 2031–
32. Thus far, lower courts have not substituted calling “failure to accommodate” claims “disparate 
treatment,” as Justice Thomas has predicted. See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. 
Jetstream Ground Servs., Inc., 134 F. Supp. 3d 1298, 1317 (D. Colo. 2015); see also Schwingel v. 
Elite Prot. & Sec., Ltd., No. 11 C 8712, 2015 WL 7753064, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2015). 
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A. Creating a New Prima Facie Standard 
Some courts have taken the approach of adjusting a plaintiff’s prima facie 
case under Title VII religious discrimination to two elements, eliminating the 
“informed” component altogether.88 This new standard requires that a plaintiff 
show “(1) she had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with an 
employment requirement; and (2) her need for an accommodation was a 
motivating factor in the employer’s decision to take an adverse employment 
action against her.”89 Under this new standard, the previous discussion of 
notice becomes obsolete, as courts are specifically directed to take a more 
broad view of the “motivating factor” issue in determining liability. 
In Jetstream, for example, the court determined that there was sufficient 
evidence to show that the reason the employer laid off a Muslim employee was 
because it “knew—or, at the very least, suspected” that the employee wore 
clothing (a headscarf and long skirts) that was non-compliant with company 
dress code due to a religious belief, and therefore required an 
accommodation.90 In making this determination, the court pointed to evidence 
that this employee wore religious garments in the workplace during non-work 
hours, as well as the fact that this particular employee was associated with 
other employees who had informed their employer that they were Muslim and 
desired a religious accommodation in dress.91 
B. The Same Prima Facie Standard and Allowing an Alternative Means of 
Proof 
Rather than adjusting the standard completely, other lower courts have 
since kept the prima facie elements the same but have provided, based on 
Abercrombie, a new means by which a plaintiff may satisfy element two, thus 
allowing alternative grounds of proof.92 In Mathis, the plaintiff, an atheist, 
brought a failure to accommodate claim after being discharged for obscuring a 
religious mission statement on his company badge.93 In discussing a prima 
 
 88. See, e.g., Jetstream Ground Servs., 134 F. Supp. 3d at 1318; see also Schwingel, 2015 
WL 7753064, at *5. 
 89. Jetstream Ground Servs., 134 F. Supp. 3d at 1318 (emphasis added). Notably, the 
remainder of the burden-shifting analysis remains the same: “If the employee establishes a prima 
facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant employer to ‘(1) conclusively rebut one or more 
elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, (2) show that it offered a reasonable accommodation, 
or (3) show that it was unable to accommodate the employee’s religious needs reasonably without 
undue hardship.’” Id. (quoting Thomas v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1156 
(10th Cir. 2000)). 
 90. Id. at 1298, 1318. 
 91. Id. at 1318–19. 
 92. See Mathis v. Christian Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., No. CV 13-3740, 2016 WL 
304766 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2016). 
 93. Id. at *3. 
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facie case, the court provided that the plaintiff “must show: ‘(1) [he] holds a 
sincere religious belief that conflicts with a job requirement; (2) [he] informed 
his employer of the conflict; and (3) [he] was disciplined for failing to comply 
with the conflicting requirement.’”94 In examining the second element, the 
court first discussed evidence showing that plaintiff did in fact inform his 
employer of his religious objection to wearing the badge.95 
In addition to this, however, the court cited to Abercrombie and stated that 
plaintiff had also presented evidence that would allow the jury to “infer that 
[the employer] failed to accommodate plaintiff ‘because’ of plaintiff’s 
atheism.”96 Title VII, the court continued, “does not require him to prove that 
he advertised his atheistic beliefs to his employer, nor does it require that he 
prove that he phrased his disagreement with the mission statement in terms of 
his atheism;” rather, the plaintiff only need show that the employer acted with 
an improper motive when it terminated him.97 This discussion was grouped 
into the court’s discussion under element two of the prima facie case, 
demonstrating that it was an alternative to actually informing the employer of 
the need for an accommodation.98 
C. Abandoning the Prima Facie Standard and Taking a Broad Approach 
Finally, there is a possibility that, like the “disparate treatment/intentional 
discrimination” language set forth in Abercrombie and Justice Thomas’s 
prediction, courts will now abandon the traditional prima facie standard for 
failure to accommodate cases and instead take a broader approach to these 
claims. 
The Fifth Circuit was recently tasked with the question of applying 
Abercrombie in the case Nobach v. Woodland Vill. Nursing Center. Inc.99 In 
this case, a nursing home aide named Kelsey Nobach was discharged for not 
praying the Rosary with a patient as required by her job, which she refused to 
do based upon a religious belief.100 The court held that there was no evidence 
that Nobach’s religious beliefs were a motivating factor in her discharge under 
Abercrombie, given that she had failed to show that her employer “came to 
 
 94. Id. at *8 (quoting EEOC v. GEO Grp., Inc., 616 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
 95. Id. at *9. 
 96. Id. at *10. 
 97. Mathis, 2016 WL 304766, at *10. The court cited to varying evidence reflecting the fact 
that the employer was possibly aware that plaintiff’s refusal to wear the badge was for religious 
reasons, and thus may have terminated him with the motive of avoiding making an 
accommodation. 
 98. See id. 
 99. 799 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 100. Id. at 376. Nobach was a former Jehovah’s Witness who had been expelled from the 
Church at age sixteen. 
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know of or suspect her bona-fide religious belief” before her discharge.101 The 
only evidence presented in the case, the court reasoned, was that Nobach had 
informed an assistant that she could not read the Rosary because it was against 
her religion, but there was no evidence that Nobach or the assistant ever 
relayed this information regarding her religious belief to the employer before 
her termination.102 
Interestingly, in setting out the standard for Nobach’s claim, the Fifth 
Circuit chose to analyze the claim as an intentional discrimination or disparate 
treatment claim, stating that “Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to 
discharge an individual ‘because of such individual’s . . . religion.’”103 The 
court went on to discuss that, based on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Abercrombie, 
When evaluating causation in a Title VII case, the question is not what the 
employer knew about the employee’s religious beliefs. Nor is the question 
whether the employer knew that there would be a conflict between the 
employee’s religious belief and some job duty. Instead, the critical question is 
what motivated the employer’s employment decision.104 
In a footnote, the court noted that Nobach’s failure to accommodate claim 
would have been dismissed for the same reasons stated above, given that her 
employer lacked any knowledge or suspicion that there was a conflict between 
Nobach’s religious beliefs and her job duties.105 So although this case did not 
specifically contain a failure to accommodate claim, it alludes to the idea that 
intentional discrimination under Title VII also encompasses the failure to 
accommodate religious practices. Thus, it is possible that these claims can be 
analyzed broadly by utilizing the standard set forth in Abercrombie, thereby 
replacing the “failure to accommodate” category of cases in some instances.106 
 
 101. Id. at 379. 
 102. Id. at 376–77, 379. This holding has been summarized as follows: 
If Nobach presented any evidence that Woodland knew, suspected, or reasonably should 
have known the cause for her refusing this task was her conflicting religious belief—and 
that Woodland was motivated by this knowledge or suspicion—the jury would certainly 
have been entitled to reject Woodland’s explanation for Nobach’s termination. But no 
such evidence was ever provided to the jury. The court therefore held that a reasonable 
jury would not have had a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find that Woodland 
intentionally discriminated against Nobach because of her religion. Kimberly Kemper, 
There Was No Evidence That Religion Was the Motive, 32 NO. 22 EMP. ALERT NL 3 
(2015). 
 103. Nobach, 799 F.3d at 378 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2012)). 
 104. Id. (emphasis added; internal citations omitted). 
 105. Id. at 379 n.8. 
 106. Based upon statutory language, there would, of course, still be the requirement that an 
employer show that a reasonable accommodation was offered or could not have been sustained 
without undue hardship. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 
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IV.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Commentators have thus far been in discussion regarding the implications 
that Abercrombie may have upon religious discrimination as a matter of policy. 
The idea of whether the case was “pro-employee” or “anti-employer” was 
immediately discussed by mainstream media. Beyond this, it is important to 
look at what impact, if any, this case will have upon the future of religious 
employment discrimination law in the realm of accommodations and as a 
whole. 
A. Public Commentary 
1. Was the Decision “Pro-Employee?” 
From one perspective, it certainly seems as though Samantha Elauf’s case 
was a “victory” for employees—the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth 
Circuit’s adverse decision against her, and the case soon after settled in her 
favor.107 The case was decided on an 8-1 majority,108 and Justice Scalia even 
proclaimed, “[t]his is really easy” from the bench before announcing the 
Court’s ruling.109 The General Counsel for the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission released a statement following the decision, calling it “a victory 
for our increasingly diverse society.”110 The decision was also praised by 
religious and civil liberties organizations such as the Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State, celebrating the fact that “employers cannot put 
their head in the sand when they suspect that an applicant will need a religious 
accommodation.”111 
 
 107. Abercrombie paid $25,670 in damages to Elauf and $18,983 in court costs. Press 
Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Abercrombie Resolves Religious 
Discrimination Case Following Supreme Court Ruling in Favor of EEOC (July 28, 2015), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/7-28-15.cfm [http://perma.cc/ARD3-AKF6]. 
 108. See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2030 (2015). 
Additionally, while the case was pending, Abercrombie announced that it planned to relax its 
“Look Policy” for employees. Sarah Kaplan, The Rise and Fall of Abercrombie’s ‘Look Policy,’ 
WASH. POST, (June 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/06/ 
02/the-rise-and-fall-of-abercrombies-look-policy/ [http://perma.cc/3UWH-F4B4]. 
 109. Walter Olson, A Hijab and A Hunch: Abercrombie and the Limits of Religious 
Accommodation, 2014-2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 139, 139. 
 110. Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Supreme Court Rules 
in Favor of EEOC in Abercrombie Religious Discrimination Case (June 1, 2015), http://www.ee 
oc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/6-1-15.cfm [http://perma.cc/A7YH-MC5S]. 
 111. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Allows Suit by Muslim Woman Who Says Headscarf Cost 
Her a Job, WASH. POST (June 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/supreme-court 
-allows-suit-by-muslim-woman-who-says-head-scarf-cost-her-a-job/2015/06/01/977293f0-088c-
11e5-9e39-0db921c47b93_story.html [http://perma.cc/7FBZ-A485]. 
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2. Was the Decision “Anti-Employer?” 
On the other hand, employers were immediately concerned about the 
negative impact the holding may have on them, namely the potential of 
increasing their likelihood of liability under Title VII.112 One major concern 
was that the implications of the case on the already-difficult balance between 
good hiring practices and the need to ask probing or possibly illegal questions 
to potential employees.113 Small businesses were also concerned that the 
holding would fall more harshly upon them in that it “force[s] employers to 
make assumptions about an applicant’s religion” and “sets an unclear and 
confusing standard making business owners extremely vulnerable to inevitable 
discrimination lawsuits.”114 
B. Legal Commentary 
1. The Supreme Court’s Failure to Accommodate Case History 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Abercrombie was the third of all cases it 
has decided pertaining to failure to accommodate a religious practice, and the 
first of those being decided in favor of the religious employee.115 Generally 
speaking, the Supreme Court’s previous decisions regarding the duty to 
accommodate narrowly defined an employer’s obligation to accommodate an 
employee’s religious conduct.116 In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, the 
Court held that the employer was not required to accommodate an employee’s 
religious practice where it would violate the employer’s seniority system, since 
this constituted an “undue hardship,” defining the term narrowly as anything 
that bears “more than a de minimis cost” to the employer.117 Later, in Ansonia 
Board of Education v. Philbrook, the Court determined that an employer’s 
 
 112. Tricia Gorman, Supreme Court Favors Muslim Woman in Abercrombie Discrimination 
Suit, 22 No. 6 WESTLAW JOURNAL CLASS ACTION 1 (2015). 
 113. See Barnes, supra note 111. In oral argument for the case, Justice Kagan asserted that 
Abercrombie was contending that: 
[T]he problem with the rule is that it requires Abercrombie to engage in what might be 
thought of as an awkward conversation, to ask some questions. Now, people can disagree 
about whether one can ask those questions in a way that’s awkward at all, but you’re 
saying that we should structure the whole legal system to make sure that there is no 
possibility of that awkward conversation ever taking place. Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 52, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015) (No. 14-86). 
 114. Gorman, supra note 112. 
 115. Debbie N. Kaminer, Religious Accommodation in the Workplace: Why Federal Courts 
Fail to Provide Meaningful Protection of Religious Employees, 20 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 107, 109, 
122 (2015). The other two cases were Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84–85 
(1977) and Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 63, 66 (1986), which pertained to the 
issues of “undue hardship” and “reasonable accommodation,” respectively. 
 116. Kaminer, supra note 115, at 121. 
 117. 432 U.S. at 84. 
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offered accommodation of unpaid leave was reasonable although it caused the 
employee to suffer lost pay, since a reasonable accommodation is merely one 
that “eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and religious 
practices,” and employees do not hold an entitlement to their preferred 
accommodation.118 In contrast, through its decision in Abercrombie, the Court 
seemed to for the first time expand the reach of Title VII more broadly, by 
refusing to narrowly construe the notice requirement, and holding that religious 
practices receive “favored treatment.”119 This in itself may demonstrate a legal 
policy shift towards more expansive protections for employees under Title VII. 
2. Similarities to the ADA – Surviving Summary Judgment and 
Expanding Accommodations 
Other legal commentators have proposed the possibility that that like 
accommodating disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 
religious practices may be generally shifting into a more “accommodation-
friendly” direction.120 The ADA places an affirmative duty upon employers to 
accommodate an otherwise-qualified employee’s known physical or mental 
limitations (a “disability”), unless the employer can “demonstrate that the 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the 
[employer’s] business.”121 Originally passed in 1990, the ADA was amended 
in 2008 through Congress’s passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Amendments Act (ADAAA).122 The amendments came about in response to 
the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the term “disability” and 
 
 118. 479 U.S. at 66, 70. As Professor Debbie N. Kaminer points out, there is a “striking lack 
of consensus” within the American legal system regarding “the appropriate treatment of religious 
employees in the workplace.” Kaminer, supra note 115, at 118. This is illustrated by the fact that 
in all three cases discussed above, the reasoning of the district courts was rejected by the appeals 
courts, and the reasoning of the appeals courts were ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court. Id. 
This is further demonstrated through the lack of a uniform standard across circuits in analyzing 
failure to accommodate cases both prior to and after the Abercrombie decision. Id. at 111–12. 
 119. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2034 (2015). Professor 
Kaminer also contends that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hardison and Philbrook were at 
odds with Congressional intent, which sought that an employee’s religious beliefs be 
accommodated in the workplace. Kaminer, supra note 115, at 131. 
 120. See Olson, supra note 109, at 155–56. 
 121. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012). 
 122. Nicole Buonocore Porter, The New ADA Backlash, 82 TENN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2014). Thus, 
these cases also require a two-step, burden-shifting analysis, wherein an employee must first 
make a prima facie showing that he or she is statutorily disabled and otherwise qualified under 
the Act, and if so the burden then shifts to the employer to show that it offered a reasonable 
accommodation, or that offering such an accommodation would be an undue hardship. See, e.g., 
McMillan v. N.Y.C., 711 F.3d 120, 125, 128 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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limitation of the scope of covered individuals under the statute.123 The 
ADAAA served to vastly expand the range of individuals considered 
“disabled” under the law, as well as define other terms and requirements in 
employees’ favor.124 
Since the passage of the ADAAA, many more plaintiffs in disability 
discrimination cases survive summary judgment because the amendments have 
made the threshold question of whether an individual meets the statutory 
definition of disability broader and therefore easier to meet.125 Thus, cases are 
more frequently proceeding to the merits.126 Additionally, similar to Title VII 
and the decision in Abercrombie, the ADA amendments only require a plaintiff 
to show that an employer made an adverse decision “because of an actual or 
perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits 
or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”127 
While this area of law is still open and developing, researchers have 
observed that since the ADAAA, in reaching the merits of cases, courts have 
trended towards drawing more favorable inferences for plaintiffs and generally 
reaching pro-employee outcomes in certain areas.128 For example, where 
plaintiffs were requesting accommodations pertaining to the physical functions 
of a job, courts were more likely to deny summary judgment for the employer 
and find that a plaintiff was otherwise qualified, as well as more willing to 
require employers to provide a reasonable accommodation moving forward.129 
However, where plaintiffs were likely to be placed in danger through 
employment or were requesting an accommodation pertaining to the structural 
norms of the workplace, such as attendance, hours, schedule shifts, and leaves 
of absence, courts were more likely to dismiss the case on summary judgment, 
and thus unable to proceed to the merits.130 Growing case law in this area will 
provide more definitive outcomes of the amendments, including the potential 
that this will “change the landscape” of this area of law, making the 
 
 123. Porter, supra note 122, at 4, 9. See also Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation 
and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1120 (2010). 
 124. Weber, supra note 123, at 1120, 1123. 
 125. Porter, supra note 122, at 4. One research study conducted found that courts granted 
summary judgment to employers on the issue of disability in 74.4% of the cases pre-
Amendments, which decreased to only 45.9% post-Amendments. See Stephen F. Befort, An 
Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under the ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 2027, 2050–51 (2013). 
 126. Porter, supra note 122, at 18. 
 127. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2012) (emphasis added); See Porter, supra note 122, at 17. 
(“The focus is now on the employer’s motivation for its adverse action, rather than focusing on 
how serious the employer considered the plaintiff’s condition.”). 
 128. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Special Treatment Stigma After the ADA Amendments Act, 
43 PEPP. L. REV. 213, 227–28 (2016). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 229–30. 
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availability of accommodations in the workplace the “new normal.”131 It is 
likely that these trends in cases under the ADA will help predict the future of 
Title VII, and that policy shifts in disability discrimination as a whole may 
serve to influence religious discrimination law as well. 
3. Extending the Case Beyond Failure to Hire 
Another general policy matter is determining the extent to which this 
holding will be expanded beyond the failure to hire context, rather than limited 
to cases that are analogous to Elauf’s. As demonstrated by case law following 
the decision thus far, courts have not hesitated to extend the holding in 
Abercrombie to all aspects of religious discrimination, particularly termination 
and discharge.132 Yet the question remains as to what bearing Abercrombie 
will actually have where an employee is already at work under an employer 
and is aware of a company policy. 
One issue discussed in detail at oral arguments was that Samantha Elauf 
did not herself have notice that she was or would be non-compliant with 
Abercrombie’s “Look Policy” at the time of her application.133 Because of this, 
it would be unreasonable to expect her to request an accommodation for a job 
requirement that she did not know existed.134 This is distinguishable from a 
case like Nobach, where because the current employee knew of and chose to 
violate the employer’s workplace policy before the employer was made aware 
of her need for a religious accommodation, there was no liability under Title 
VII, even following the Court’s decision in Abercrombie.135 The question 
therefore remains as to how the Court’s holding in Abercrombie will apply or 
even be beneficial to such employees in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
Close examination of the Supreme Court’s decision in Abercrombie and 
the various circuit case law leading up to it reveals the complexities and 
intricacies of religious employment discrimination law. Perhaps it is an enigma 
of a case, only beneficial to Samantha Elauf in her job application for a retail 
store with a now-extinct and arguably arbitrary “Look Policy.” Perhaps its 
legacy, however, will extend deeply into employment discrimination on the 
basis of religion, with a positive policy spin towards employees and the duty of 
 
 131. Id. at 258. 
 132. See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Jetstream Ground Servs., Inc., 134 F. 
Supp. 3d 1298, 1317–18 (D. Colo. 2015); see also Schwingel, 2015 WL 7753064, at *5. The 
altering of the prima facie standard and elimination of the “informed” component in some circuits 
may or may not be one lasting legacy from the case. 
 133. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 113, at 37–38. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Nobach v. Woodland Vill. Nursing Ctr. Inc.799 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2015). 
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employers to accommodate religious practices in the workplace. If nothing 
else, Justice Scalia and the Court made clear that under Title VII, employees’ 
religious practices are given “favored treatment,” and employers are liable 
where even suspicion of religious behavior is a “motivating factor” in an 
adverse employment decision.136 In an ideal world, open dialogue, acceptance, 
and tolerance in the workplace would prevent Title VII claims from even 
reaching courts. But until that time, we can only hope that the legal world will 
come to a consensus and establish a clear and workable standard for religious 
discrimination claims—or, at the least, find the means by which each smaller 




 136. See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032–34 (2015). 
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